The battle of Platea was a battle of the 5th Century B.C. In this battle the allied Greek city-states are able to hand Persia it’s first real land defeat of the war. In the end it is the dual blows of Platea and the naval battle of Mycale that spell an end to Xerxes’ invasion of Greece.
Platea was a battle of the Persian Wars. The invasion of Greece launched by Xerxes was not the first of it’s kind. The first invasion had been launched by Xerxes’ father Darius the Great and had failed at the battle of Marathon against the Athenians. Xerxes was eager to get revenge for his father’s defeat, but he was careful about the preparations. Thus when Xerxes’ great army, estimated to be about 250,000 men in size by modern historians (Herodotus gives 2,000,000 as the number, but even for the Achaemenids this was impossible) invaded in 480 B.C. the whole of Greece was caught off guard. Many Greek cities such as Argos capitulated to Xerxes without a fight, but a majority of the city-states chose to stand and fight. In order to buy themselves more time the Greeks at a conference at Delphi decided that one of the city-states should send a force to hold off the Persian attack. Ultimately the Spartans, under Leonidas I, were chosen. Thebes and Thespis volunteered to assist. In the resulting battle of Thermopylae the Spartans held off the Persians for three days before being overwhelmed. Recovering quickly from the losses he had endured Xerxes pressed forward from Thermopylae and poured his massive army on Greece proper. Swarming like angry bees the Persians were unstoppable, Thebes was forced to surrender, the countryside was ravaged, and Athens, leader of the resistance, was torched. However even at this low point Greece still held out, the majority of the Athenian population and military had been able to get away in time and converged at Salamis. The other remaining leaders joined the Athenians there. At the meetings on Salamis a bold plan was decided under the leadership of Themistocles, the father of the Athenian Navy. In the resulting battle of Salamis the much smaller, but better built, allied Greek navy, was able to draw the numerically superior Persian navy into a trap and destroy it. This victory at Salamis was, in hindsight, the decisive turning of the tide of the invasion. However at the time there was still great uncertainty among the Greeks as to whether they could win, and we know from the records that Xerxes did not view Salamis as a great defeat as much as a small setback. Despite this the destruction of a majority of the Persian fleet caused major supply problems for the Persians. These supply problems caused Xerxes, and most of his army, to turn back to Sardis in Asia Minor. In his stead Xerxes left his brother-in-law Mardonius, whom he had made satrap of Greece, as commander of all remaining Persian land forces. Mardonius was an old veteran of many battles and had served with Darius. However due to a loss he suffered at the naval battle at Athos prior to Darius’ invasion Mardonius had been living in disgrace. Xerxes had decided to restore his brother-in-law to a position of authority shortly before the invasion (in fact Mardonius was a chief proponent of the invasion in the first place). Mardonius’ first action was to a send a peace offering to Athens via Alexander I of Macedon (a distant ancestor of Alexander the Great). It goes without saying that the Athenians, who had moved back into Athens, rejected the offer, and knowing that Mardonius was likely to attack in response they sent to Sparta for help. But the Spartans, as always during times of crises, chose to argue with the Athenians instead. To the Spartans, whose city lied safely behind the formidable Isthmus Wall near Corinth, Mardonius posed no danger. They argued that as long as the Persians were deprived of supplies there was no danger and cautioned a defensive policy. Of course Athens disagreed and argued that the Persians’ supply problems made the time prefect for an attack, and thus favored an offensive policy. Mardonius used the opportunity to attack, forcing the Athenians out of their homes a second time. After a second peace offer from Mardonius the Athenians, together with the Megarans and Plataeans, sent to Sparta for aid. Sparta again declined, citing a religious festival and fear of a helot revolt for their reasons. For the entire winter season of 480-479 Athens and Sparta argued back and forth over what to do, until finally Chileos of Tegea was able to get the Spartans to cooperate by threatening them with the knowledge that unless Sparta work with the rest of the alliance Athens would make a separate peace with Persia. This finally got the Spartans to cooperate and the ephors (a council of older men who could even veto the kings) decided to send a large force to make up their part of the allied army in the summer of 479. Commanding this force was Pausanias, the regent for the young king Pleistarchos, the son of Leonidas I. When Mardonius, still in the ruins of Athens, heard of the Spartan mobilization, he burned what remained of the city and buried it under a layer of soil. Mardonius then moved his Persian forces into Boeotia. Meanwhile the armies of the city-states were beginning to come together. However the Athenians viewed Mardonius’ retreat into Boeotia with increasing concern so they, and the Spartans, decide to go ahead and scout. The unified Spartan-Athenian force made camp at Mt. Cithaeron. Mardonius knew that too give battle in a enclosed space would be a repeat of the first two days at Thermopylae, which Mardonius wanted to avoid. He sent his cavalry forward to try to bait the Greek force unto the open plain near Plataea, where he could use his numerical advantage to it’s fullest. However Pausanias, the agreed upon supreme commander, recognized this and held his line against the Persian cavalry, inflicting heavy causalities and killing the cavalry commander. Following the Persian retreat Pausanias decided to move down from the mountain and instead make his line in the hills opposite the Persian camp on the plains, this way the Greek line could form itself fully and yet be safe from Persian cavalry. By now the rest of the allied army had received word and was marching to the hills near Platea.
The allied Greek army was an impressive sight. The total number of Greek soldiers present at Platea numbered 110,000 according to modern estimates. Of these about 38,700 were hoplites while 71,300 where light troops (peltasts, skirmishers, and assorted others). Of the hoplites the following list shows the number of hoplites from each city in the alliance against Persia: Sparta: 10,000 (of which 5,000 were full spartiates, the largest number seen outside Sparta), Athens: 8,000, Plataea: 600, Megara: 3,000, Corinth: 5,000, Tegea: 1,500, Potidea: 300, Arcadian Orchomenus: 600, Sicyon: 3,000, Epidaurus: 800, Troezen: 1,000, Leprea: 200, Mycene and Tiryns: 400, Floia: 1,000, Hermion: 300, Eretria and Styra: 600, Chalkis: 400, Ambrakia: 500, Lefkas and Anactorium: 800, Cephalonia: 200, and lastly Aegina: 500. Of the light troops about 35,000 were armed helots from Sparta, which was part of a series of political reforms on the part of Pausanias. Another 1,800 were from Thespis and the other 35,000 came from the other cities, one for each hoplite. The formation taken, is thus: The Spartans took position on the right wing, the position of honor, following them was the bulk of the allied cities, and finally on the left wing was the Athenians.
The Persian army was small and tired, but remained confident. The total numbers of the Persian army at Plataea that day is widely debated to this day. Herodotus gives us the number of 300,000. This number has come under heavy debate, since Herodotus is noted for drastic inflation of enemy numbers to make the Greeks look better. In this article I shall use a conservative estimate of about 75,000. Because the Persian sources do not detail the numbers of their army we have to make a guess based upon available information. According to the records the Persian and Median contingent was a full baivarabam, a tactical unit of about 10,000 men. In addition to these troops are the Ten Thousand Immortals, the Persian imperial guard, left behind by Xerxes to still make his presence felt even in his absence. The Greek contingent from Thebes and Thessaly numbered about 30,000. There were also an unknown number of Bactrian, Indian, and Saka auxiliaries present as well. 10,000 cavalry, which played a vital role in the battle, were also present in the Persian line up (the Saka probably made up a sizeable contingent of the cavalry). Mardonius set his army as such: The Persians and the Medians laid next to each other on the left, followed by the Bactrians, Indians, Sakes, and the Greeks on the right wing.
The battle of Platea was the last great battle of the war. Both Pausanias and Mardonius knew the other’s position was strong, and neither man wanted to put his army at risk. For the next 10 days neither army moves a muscle, but then problems set in. Due to Persian cavalry raids the Greek source of water, a fountain known as the Gargaphia, was polluted and due to the same cavalry raids the Greeks could not access the only other source, the Asopos River. Before long the cavalry raids also cut off the food supplies, especially after 500 oxen where captured. The Persians had similar problems and before long Artabazus, one of the six higher commanders, advises Mardonius to retreat to Thebes to re-supply the army. Mardonius refuses, confident that his supplies will last as long as necessary. Meanwhile in the Greek camp the allied commanders are close to rioting, the loss of water and the low state of the food supply are taking their toll on the men. The allied commanders soon break out into argument over what to do, some wish to retreat, others to just attack the Persians, and so on. Pausanias however has his own plan and in typical Spartan fashion lays it out to the commanders without a single argument, leaving them little choice but to listen. Pausanias’ plan was to move the Greek army back up Mt. Cithaeron, where water and food are in abundance, and the Persian cavalry can’t attack them with impunity. The plan is agreed upon, and Pausanias reveals he plans to do it all at night. So as night fell the allied center began to pull back first but instead of going up to Mt. Cithaeron they get lost in the darkness and as a result end up at the walls of Plataea itself. After being satisfied that enough time had passed Pausanias then had he Athenians on the left move out as well and like the center get lost, in an entirely different direction. Finally the time comes for the Spartans to move, but just at this critical juncture one of the Spartan regimental commanders (Greek: Lochagos) refuses to move. The unhappy commander, known as Amompharetus, is upset that Pausanias did not consult him before making up this plan, and so refuses to move his men. The result is Pausanias personally arguing with the man for several hours, until nearly dawn. As dawn breaks Pausanias, who’s Spartans are the only ones to even go in the right direction, realizes that his army has broken up and gotten lost. Mardonius also realizes this after noticing that the Greek army is gone. In a flurry in activity Pausanias begins to send messages to try to find where his army has gone and try to salvage the situation, at the same time Mardonius, believing that the Greeks are breaking up due to arguments, launches his attack. Mardonius sends his cavalry and archers and later the infantry lead by the Ten Thousand Immortals against the Spartans personally, dispatching the rest of his army on the center troops and the Athenians. Pausanias, realizing what is coming, had already positioned his army on a mountain ridge, in addition the allied center also recognizes the urgency to form up quickly and try to meet up with the Athenians, whom they can see from the city walls. Mardonius reacts to this in good time and dispatches the Greek contingent of his army to keep the Athenians and the allied center from linking up. Meanwhile the Spartans manage to beat off the cavalry attack, though the ever-increasing numbers of Persian archers begin to cause a problem as their arrow fall causes the Spartans to duck under their shields. However the Spartans hold their position, by this time the Tegeans, who had broken off from the rest of the center arrive to support the Spartans. Despite calls from his own men and the Tegeans to advance and break up the archers Pausanias refuses, stating that the omens are not right. However the Tegeans do not have the Spartan’s patience and unable to take being shot at any longer charge down the mountain and straight into a wall of wooden shields. The momentum of the Tegeans propels them through the wall and into the mist of the Persian line. The battle soon becomes a slaughter of the Persians as the longer spears and heavier shields and armor of the Greeks give them an advantage over the Persians. Pausanias, saying that he saw a good omen, orders the Spartans to join the fray. With the added presence of the Spartans the Persian infantry begins to rout and soon the Tegeans fall behind the Spartans in the advance. Only the Ten Thousand Immortals, forming a deep square around their leader, still stand. The Spartans, itching to take revenge for Leonidas, charge straight at them. In the ensuing blood bath the Immortals fight hard but are no match for the Spartans, their commander Hydranes falls and soon after him Mardonius falls as well. Without the commander to lead them the Persian army falls apart, even the Thebans, fighting the Athenians at that time, are forced to pull back to camp. Artabazus then decides to retreat, believing that further conflict with the Greeks will only increase the slaughter. As the Persians pull away to lick their wounds the Spartans, blood up, attack the Persian encampment despite the lack of equipment to take it. The other Greeks join in, and the camp falls to them, the remaining camp followers are killed and the battle formally comes to an end. Because of conflicts between sources a definite causality count cannot be given.
Plataea was one of the great battles in Greek history. In the immediate aftermath of Plataea the remaining Persian commanders on land, lead by Artabazus, decide that Greece is no longer worth it anymore and make the long trek home, abandoning the collaborationist governments in Boeotia. Soon after the remnants of the Persian navy are annihilated at Mycale, ending the Persian presence in Greece on both land and sea. Pausanias would lead the siege of Thebes himself in the wake of the Persian retreat and would oversee the massacre of the Theban political leadership. After the fall of Thebes the Persian treasury in Greece would be discovered, it is unknown what happened to it. In the greater aftermath of Plataea the impact the victory had was that never again would Persia invade Greece, or even harbor a dream of conquering the peninsula ever again. True, the Persians would politically continue to be involved, but never again militarily. Another long lasting impact was that after Plataea the Persians would respect the Greek way of fighting, heralding in the large-scale use of Greek mercenaries in Persia. In conclusion the Battle of Plataea was a great victory of Greek arms and the Greek method of fighting, a great battle of history. |
